Maine\u27s Sex Offender Registry and the Ex Post Facto Clause: An Examination of the Law Court\u27s Unwillingness to Use Independent Constitutional Analysis in State v. Letalien by Wille, Lauren
Maine Law Review 
Volume 63 Number 1 Article 12 
January 2010 
Maine's Sex Offender Registry and the Ex Post Facto Clause: An 
Examination of the Law Court's Unwillingness to Use Independent 
Constitutional Analysis in State v. Letalien 
Lauren Wille 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Wille, Maine's Sex Offender Registry and the Ex Post Facto Clause: An Examination of the Law 
Court's Unwillingness to Use Independent Constitutional Analysis in State v. Letalien, 63 Me. L. Rev. 367 
(2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/12 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
MAINE’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND THE EX 
POST FACTO CLAUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
LAW COURT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO USE 
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN 
STATE V. LETALIEN 
Lauren Wille 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE STATE V. LETALIEN DECISION 
 A. The Facts of the Case 
 B. Federal Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence and the Law Court’s Analysis 
 C. Justice Silver’s Concurrence 
III. INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN MAINE 
 A. Some Views on the Validity of State Courts Conducting Independent 
Constitutional Analyses 
 B. Independent State Constitutional Analysis in Maine 
IV. SHOULD THE LAW COURT HAVE CONDUCTED AN INDEPENDENT STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 
SORNA OF 1999?  
 A. The Law Court Should Have Reserved the Question of 
Coextensiveness for a Case When an Independent Analysis Would 
Have Been Necessary 
 B. Can a More Useful Analysis Be Suggested?  
V. CONCLUSION 
368 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
MAINE’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND THE EX 
POST FACTO CLAUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
LAW COURT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO USE 
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN 
STATE V. LETALIEN 
Lauren Wille* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Eric Letalien pleaded guilty to the gross sexual assault of a thirteen-
year-old girl, an offense he committed when he was nineteen years old.1  At the 
time of his sentencing in August of 1996, Letalien was subject to Maine’s Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1995 (SORNA of 1995).2  Pursuant 
to SORNA of 1995, Letalien was required to register his address with the State 
Bureau of Identification (SBI) and update his address in the event he moved.3  This 
registration requirement was to be in effect for fifteen years from the time he was 
released from incarceration.4  After five years, however, Letalien would be eligible 
to petition for a waiver from the Superior Court if he could show that the 
registration requirement was no longer necessary.5   
In 1999, the Maine Legislature passed a more stringent version of the SORNA 
law (SORNA of 1999).6  In 2001, the Legislature once again amended SORNA of 
1999 so that it applied retroactively to offenses committed on or after June 30, 
1992.7  As a result of the 2001 amendment, Letalien was subject to the reporting 
requirements of SORNA of 1999.8  Under the amended law, instead of being 
required to register as a sex offender for fifteen years, with the possibility of 
obtaining a waiver after five years, Letalien was required to register for the rest of 
his life without the possibility of ever obtaining a waiver.9  In addition, SORNA of 
1999 required him to report in person to his local law enforcement agency every 
ninety days in order to verify his address and place of employment, to be 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor 
Melvyn Zarr for his invaluable insight and guidance on this Note.  I would also like to thank the editors 
and staff of the Maine Law Review for their excellent editing and hard work. 
 1. State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d 4, 7-8.  According to then-Maine law, a person 
was guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engaged in a sexual act with another person who had not 
in fact attained fourteen years of age.  17-A M.R.S.A., § 253(1)(B) (1992-1993). 
 2. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d at 8 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11101-11144 (1996-1997)). 
 3. Id. ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2)-(3) (1996-1997)). 
 4. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2) (1996-1997)). 
 5. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(6)(C) (1996-1997)). 
 6. Id. ¶ 6, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 34-A 
M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (1999-2000))). 
 7. Id. ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-7 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified at 
34-A M.R.S.A. § 11202 (2001-2002))).   
 8. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10. 
 9. Id. ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10. 
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fingerprinted, and to have his photograph taken.10  In 2003, the Legislature once 
again amended SORNA of 1999 to require the SBI to maintain an Internet website 
posting this information.11 
When Letalien was arrested in 2007 for failure to comply with the SORNA of 
1999 registration requirements, he challenged SORNA of 1999, asserting that its 
retroactive application against him violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the 
Maine Constitution and the United States Constitution.12  Letalien argued that the 
Maine Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws afforded a greater level of 
protection than the minimum standard secured by the Federal Constitution, and that 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, should utilize an 
analysis independent of federal courts’ analyses of ex post facto challenges.13  The 
Law Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Maine and Federal 
Constitutions are coextensive, and evaluated the law consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court’s analysis of ex post facto laws, ultimately concluding that 
the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 was a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clauses of both constitutions.14 
Justice Silver concurred in the judgment, and argued that Maine’s Constitution 
provides a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws than the United 
States Constitution.15  His concurrence focused on the location of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause in the Declaration of Rights article in the Maine Constitution, as compared 
with the location of the clause in the legislative powers article of the Federal 
Constitution.16  Justice Silver argued that the respective placement of the clauses 
indicated that the Maine Constitution “declares that the right to be free of ex post 
facto laws as a personal right, and not simply a limitation of legislative power, as it 
is in the United States Constitution.”17 
This Note will explore the Law Court’s conclusion that the Ex Post Facto 
provisions of the Maine Constitution and the United States Constitution are 
coextensive, and thus require the same analysis when determining whether a law 
violates the respective clauses.  Part II will discuss the Law Court’s analysis of the 
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 in Letalien, and explore the legal 
context surrounding ex post facto jurisprudence in general.  Part III will examine 
the Law Court’s history of conducting state constitutional analyses independent of 
federal courts’ analyses under the United States Constitution.  Finally, in Part IV, 
this Note will discuss whether Letalien required the Law Court to address the 
question of co-extensiveness with regard to ex post facto challenges, and also 
whether public policy in Maine demands an independent analysis of laws under the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Maine Constitution.  This Note will argue that Maine’s 
public policy objectives are better served by using a balancing approach to the 
                                                                                                     
 10. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11222(4) (2001-2002)). 
 11. Id. ¶ 9, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2003, ch. 371, § 7 (effective Sept. 13, 2003) (codified at 34-
A M.R.S.A. § 11221(9) (2004-2005))).    
 12. Id. ¶ 13, 985 A.2d at 11. 
 13. Id. ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13. 
 14. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 63, 985 A.2d at 26. 
 15. Id. ¶ 65, 985 A.2d at 26 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. ¶¶ 69-71, 985 A.2d at 28. 
 17. Id. ¶ 71, 985 A.2d at 28. 
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retroactive application of SORNA, where the court weighs the interests of the 
individual affected by the law against the State’s interests in promoting public 
safety. 
II.  THE STATE V. LETALIEN DECISION 
A.  The Facts of the Case 
In 1996, Eric Letalien pleaded guilty to the gross sexual assault of a thirteen-
year-old girl, an offense he committed when he was nineteen years old.18  He was 
sentenced to four years’ incarceration, with all but twenty months suspended, and 
four years’ probation.19  A clinical psychologist testified at trial that Letalien 
presented the lowest possible risk of reoffending.20  In August of 1996, during his 
sentencing, Letalien was subject to SORNA of 1995, which required him to register 
his address with the SBI for a period of fifteen years from the time of his release 
from incarceration.21  Under SORNA of 1995, Letalien could seek a waiver from 
the registration requirements when five years had passed from the time he first 
registered.22 
In 1999, the Maine Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999.23  SORNA of 1999, 
unlike the earlier versions of the law, recognized two categories of offenders: “sex 
offenders,” who were required to register for ten years (ten-year registrants) and 
“sexually violent offenders,” who were required to register for life (lifetime 
registrants).24  A waiver of these registration requirements was only available for 
either category of offender in the event of a pardon or if the offender’s conviction 
was overturned.25  In 2001, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 so that it 
applied to defendants sentenced for sex offenses on or after June 30, 1992, and 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. ¶ 2, 985 A.2d at 7.  The sexual encounter that resulted in his conviction took place with the 
younger sister of Letalien’s best friend.  Brief of Appellee at 3, State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 
A.2d 4.  At trial, the district court found that the act would have been consensual but for the age of the 
girl, who was two months shy of her fourteenth birthday at the time of the incident.  Id. at 4.  Letalien 
testified that at the time of the encounter, he believed she was fourteen or fifteen.  Id.  The district court 
received expert testimony from a forensic psychologist reporting that Letalien did not meet any of the 
diagnostic criteria for that of a pedophile.  Id. at 12. 
 19. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d at 8. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2)-(3) (1996-1997)).  SORNA of 1995 
defined “sex offender” as “an individual convicted of gross sexual assault if the victim had not in fact 
attained 16 years of age at the time of the crime . . . .”  § 11103(5).  Thus, because Letalien’s victim was 
thirteen-years-old at the time of the offense, Letalien was required to register under this statute. 
 22. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(6)(C) (1996-1997)).  
SORNA of 1995 provided that “[r]egistration may be waived only if . . . [t]he Superior Court, upon the 
petition of the sex offender, . . . determine[s] that the sex offender has shown a reasonable likelihood 
that registration is no longer necessary and waiver of the registration requirement is appropriate.”  § 
11121(6)(C). 
 23. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 6, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 
1999) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (1999-2000))). 
 24. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11225(1)-(2) (1999-2000)). 
 25. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11225(4) (1999-2000)). 
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before September 18, 1999.26  As a result of this amendment, Letalien became 
subject to the more stringent registration requirements of SORNA of 1999.27  
Because Letalien had been convicted of gross sexual assault of a person who was 
under the age of fourteen, he was a “sexually violent offender” under SORNA of 
1999, and thus was required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.28  In 
addition, Letalien was now required to report in person to his local law 
enforcement agency for address and employment verification, fingerprinting, and 
photographing, every ninety days, without the possibility of ever obtaining a 
waiver from these requirements.29  In 2003, the Legislature further revised SORNA 
of 1999 to require that the SBI maintain an Internet website posting information 
about the registrants.30 
Letalien first registered as a sex offender under SORNA of 1995 upon his 
release from incarceration, and for the first time under SORNA of 1999 in 2003.31  
In July 2007, Letalien was arrested for failure to comply with SORNA of 1999 
after he failed to verify his registration information as required.32  Letalien pleaded 
not guilty and claimed that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated 
the prohibition of ex post facto laws under both the Maine and Federal 
Constitutions.33  The District Court granted Letalien’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint, concluding that SORNA of 1999, as applied to Letalien, violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clauses under both constitutions.34  In December 2009, the Law Court 
affirmed the decision of the District Court.35 
B.  Federal Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence and the Law Court’s Analysis 
Article I of the United States Constitution, which sets forth the powers and 
limitations of the legislative branch, provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . 
ex post facto Law . . . .”36  Similarly, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Maine 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-7 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified at 
34-A M.R.S.A § 11202 (2001-2002))). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11202, 11203(7)(A), 11203(8)(A), 11225(2) 
(2001-2002)). 
 29. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A § 11222(4) (2001-2002)). 
 30. Id. ¶ 9, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2003, ch. 371, § 7 (effective Sept. 13, 2003) (codified at 34-
A M.R.S.A § 11221(9) (2004-2005))).  See also Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Maine Sex Offender Registry 
Online Search Service, http://sor.informe.org/sor (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 31. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 13, 985 A.2d at 11. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. ¶ 14, 985 A.2d at 11. 
 35. Id. ¶ 1, 985 A. 2d at 7.  Though the District Court evaluated the law as applied to Letalien, the 
Law Court held that a facial analysis was consistent with precedent and analyzed it as such.  Id. ¶ 34, 
985 A.2d at 17. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit provided an enlightening explanation for the importance of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause: 
It both enforces the principle that legislation is prospective, whereas punishment—the job 
assigned . . . to the judicial branch—is retrospective, and gives people a minimal sense of 
control over their lives by guaranteeing that as long as they avoid an act in the future they 
can avoid punishment for something they did in the past, which cannot be altered. 
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Constitution, which is included in the Declaration of Rights article, states that 
“[t]he Legislature shall pass no . . . ex post facto law . . . .”37  Although the phrase 
“ex post facto,” taken literally, would include any law passed after the performance 
of an action, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Collins v. Youngblood that the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal statutes that 
“disadvantage” the offender affected by them.38  Included within the scope of the 
clause is “any statute . . . which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission . . . .”39  The Law Court adopted a standard of analysis 
similar to the United States Supreme Court’s standard in Collins v. Youngblood 
when it held that a state law did not violate Maine’s Ex Post Facto Clause because 
it did not make more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission.40 
In determining whether a statute renders the punishment for a crime more 
burdensome, the Supreme Court has implemented what is known as the “intent-
effects” test.41  Under the first prong of this two-pronged analysis, the Court 
determines whether the legislature, in passing a statute, intended it to impose 
punishment, or whether the statute was intended to be of a civil, regulatory 
nature.42  If the Court finds the legislature intended the statute as punishment, the 
law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the analysis ends there.43  If the statute 
is found to have been intended as regulatory, the inquiry continues to the “effects” 
prong, where the Court determines whether the statute, as shown by the “clearest 
proof,” is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention 
to deem it ‘civil.’”44  The Supreme Court has utilized seven factors, known as the 
“Mendoza-Martinez factors,” when examining the punitive effects of a civil 
statute.45  These factors are:  
[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it 
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on 
a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies 
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
                                                                                                     
United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 37. Me. Const. art. I, § 11. 
 38. 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990). 
 39. Id. at 42 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)). 
 40. State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 869 (Me. 1992) (citing Collins, 497 U.S. at 41). 
 41. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 
(1997) (utilizing the “intent-effects” test to determine the punitive nature of a statute in the context of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (utilizing 
the “intent-effects” test to determine the punitive nature of a statute in the context of the Due Process 
Clause). 
 42. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
 45. Id. at 97.  In Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court utilized these factors in determining 
whether the Nationality Act of 1940, which divested a person of his United States citizenship if he left 
the United States for the purposes of evading the draft, was so punitive in effect as to violate the 
person’s due process rights.  372 U.S. at 163-70. 
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alternative purpose assigned.46 
The Court has stated that the factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but are 
useful guideposts.”47 
Although ex post facto challenges to sex offender registry and notification 
laws have been brought in many state and federal courts,48 the question did not 
reach the United States Supreme Court until 2003, in Smith v. Doe.49  The Smith 
Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, enacted in 1994, did not 
violate the United States Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to Doe, 
who had been convicted of the sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced in 1990.50  In 
doing so, the Court applied the “intent-effects” test and utilized the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, placing the greatest emphasis on whether the statute had a 
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose.51 
Letalien argued that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws because it rendered the punishment for his crime 
more burdensome.52  He urged the Law Court to construe the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the Maine Constitution as affording greater protection than its federal 
counterpart, and to apply an independent and more stringent method of analysis 
than the United States Supreme Court has applied in ex post facto cases.53  Prior to 
Letalien, the Law Court had never explicitly held that Maine’s constitutional 
prohibition of ex post facto laws was coextensive with the federal prohibition.  
However, the Law Court had consistently applied the same analysis set forth by the 
Supreme Court when considering ex post facto challenges.54  Letalien’s contention 
was that the placement of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the Declaration of Rights 
article in the Maine Constitution should be regarded as setting forth an affirmative 
right affording greater protection than its federal counterpart, which is “set forth as 
a limitation on the power of the legislative branch in the article establishing 
                                                                                                     
 46. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31, 985 A.2d at 16-17 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-
69). 
 47. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 48. In 1994, New Jersey became the first state to enact a sex offender registration and community 
notification statute, commonly known as “Megan’s Law.”  See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374 
(Ind. 2009).  Megan’s Law was passed after seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, molested, and 
murdered by a convicted sex offender who had moved in across the street from Megan’s family without 
their knowledge.  Id.  After the constitutionality of Megan’s Law was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404-05 (N.J. 1995), ex post facto challenges sprang up in 
courts all over the country as states enacted similar sex offender registration and notification laws.  See 
Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 374. 
 49. 538 U.S. 84. 
 50. Id. at 105-06. 
 51. Id. at 102. 
 52. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 26, 985 A.2d at 14. 
 53. Id. ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13. 
 54. See, e.g., State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 868-69 (Me. 1992); State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶¶ 
6-10, 784 A.2d 4, 8-10; Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶¶ 27-28, 932 A.2d 552, 560-61.  In Doe 
v. District Attorney, the Law Court stated: “We do not have cause to reconsider our equating the Ex Post 
Facto Clause in the Maine Constitution with the same clause in the United States Constitution.”  2007 
ME 139, ¶ 26 n.6, 932 A.2d at 560 (citation to footnote only).  Presumably, this is because the plaintiff 
in Doe did not argue that the respective clauses should not be equated. 
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legislative authority.”55  The Law Court declined to accept this argument, noting 
that the placement of the Ex Post Facto Clauses in the state and federal 
constitutions is a function of the history and context in which each constitution was 
developed, and that the framers of both constitutions regarded the ban on ex post 
facto laws as fundamental to the protection of individual liberty.56  After holding 
that the state and federal clauses are coextensive, the Law Court applied the 
“intent-effects” test set forth by the Supreme Court, utilizing the seven Mendoza-
Martinez factors to conclude that the effect of the law was so punitive as to 
overcome the Legislature’s regulatory intent.57 
In applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the retroactive application of 
SORNA of 1999, the Law Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had 
recognized that a statute’s “rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose” was the 
most significant factor in determining the punitive effect of a regulatory statute.58  
In its own evaluation, however, the Law Court emphasized two other Mendoza-
Martinez factors as being the most probative: whether the regulation imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint, and whether sanctions imposed by the statute 
have historically been regarded as punishment.59 
To the Law Court, it was beyond question that the newly imposed lifetime in-
person registration requirements on Letalien constituted an affirmative disability or 
restraint: “[Q]uarterly, in-person verification . . . , including fingerprinting and the 
submission of a photograph, for the remainder of one’s life, is undoubtedly a form 
of significant supervision by the state.”60  The Law Court distinguished SORNA of 
1999 from the Alaska sex offender registry statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Smith, which did not require updates to be made in person.61 
The Law Court’s analysis as to whether the registration requirements have 
historically been regarded as punishment differed somewhat from the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Smith.62  In Smith, the Supreme Court considered Alaska’s 
statute in light of the historical punishments of public shaming and banishment 
during colonial times.63  In contrast, the Law Court’s analysis focused on the 
“unique history of the development of sex offender registration laws in Maine 
. . . .”64  The Law Court concluded that the registration requirements were an 
integral part of the sentencing process of the earlier versions of SORNA, and thus, 
in the context of Maine’s history of sex offender registration laws, the registration 
                                                                                                     
 55. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13. 
 56. Id. ¶ 24, 985 A.2d at 14. 
 57. Id. ¶ 62, 985 A.2d at 26. 
 58. Id. ¶ 32, 985 A.2d at 17 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003)). 
 59. Id. ¶ 57, 985 A.2d at 24. 
 60. Id. ¶ 37, 985 A.2d at 18. 
 61. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 37, 985 A.2d at 18. 
 62. Id. ¶ 38, 985 A.2d at 19. 
 63. Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-98).  In Smith, the Supreme Court distinguished the registration 
law by noting that any similarity to the early punishments was misleading; shaming punishments had the 
sole purpose of stigmatizing an individual, while the registration statute’s purpose was to disseminate 
truthful information in the name of public safety.  538 U.S. at 98.  The Court stated: “Our system does 
not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as 
punishment.”  Id. 
 64. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 39, 985 A.2d at 19. 
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requirements had historically been regarded as punishment.65  Therefore, the 
retroactive application of more stringent registration requirements of SORNA of 
1999 made this “punishment” more burdensome.66 
Placing great emphasis on these two factors, the Law Court concluded that 
Letalien had shown by the “clearest proof” that the punitive effects of the 
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, as applied to those sentenced under 
earlier versions of the law and without, at minimum, affording those offenders any 
opportunity to ever be relieved of the duty, were enough to overcome the 
Legislature’s regulatory intent.67 
C.  Justice Silver’s Concurrence 
Justice Silver issued a concurring opinion in which he asserted that the Maine 
Constitution should be regarded as providing a higher level of protection against ex 
post facto laws than the Federal Constitution.68  The majority’s decision, according 
to Justice Silver, should have been based on an independent analysis under the 
Maine Constitution.69  In so concluding, Justice Silver relied on the placement of 
the clause in Maine’s Declaration of Rights article.70  He argued that it is 
significant that the framers of the Maine Constitution chose to place the prohibition 
in that article, where personal rights are enumerated, rather than in Article IV, 
which sets out the powers and limitations of Maine’s Legislature.71 
The analysis Justice Silver proposed would have paralleled the analysis 
utilized by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Doe v. Alaska.72  In that case, the 
Alaska Supreme Court struck down the very same statute upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, concluding that the Alaska Constitution 
afforded a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws than the United 
States Constitution.73  While the Doe court adopted the same “intent-effects” test 
utilized by the United States Supreme Court, it lowered the standard of proof 
required for the “effects” prong of the inquiry.74  Instead of requiring the “clearest 
proof” of punitive effects to overcome a legislature’s civil intent, it adopted a 
“presumption of constitutionality” approach.75  According to Justice Silver, 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. ¶ 43, 985 A.2d at 20-21. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. ¶ 62, 985 A.2d at 26. 
 68. Id. ¶ 65, 985 A.2d at 26 (Silver, J., concurring). 
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sufficient evidence to conclude that the statute imposed an affirmative disability or restraint: Doe had 
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adherence to the heightened “clearest proof” standard could “threaten rights 
protected by [the Maine] Constitution and might be inconsistent with the 
responsibilities of this court.”76 
Justice Silver also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the 
registration requirements of SORNA of 1999 only incidentally promoted the 
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence.77  He reasoned that 
even though the statute was not intended as retribution, there can be no doubt that it 
promotes community condemnation, and in some instances, vigilantism.78  To 
support of this position, he referred to the 2006 murders of two men whose 
addresses had been obtained by their killer from Maine’s Sex Offender Registry.79 
III.  INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN MAINE 
A.  Some Views on the Validity of State Courts Conducting Independent 
Constitutional Analyses 
It has long been an accepted tenet of federalism that states are free to adopt 
higher standards of protection than those afforded by the United States 
Constitution.80  Former United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan 
argued that the states have not only the ability, but the responsibility to their 
citizens to consider whether their own state constitutions afford greater protection 
than the constitutional floor provided by the United States Constitution: 
[T]he point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when they have 
afforded their citizens the full protections of the [F]ederal Constitution. State 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often 
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal 
law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be 
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for without it, the 
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.81 
There has been much debate concerning when and under what circumstances 
state courts should conduct independent state constitutional analyses that differ or 
afford greater protection than the Federal Constitution.  Some scholars and judges 
                                                                                                     
punishment of shaming, and resembled the conditions of parole.  Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d at 1012.  The 
Supreme Court of Indiana has similarly concluded that its state constitution affords greater protection 
against ex post facto laws than does the United States Constitution, and has also imposed this less 
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 76. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 72, 985 A.2d at 28 (Silver, J., concurring) (quoting Doe v. Alaska, 189 
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 77. Id. ¶ 75, 985 A.2d at 29. 
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sex offenders from Maine’s Online Sex Offender Registry before killing two registered sex offenders at 
their homes and then committing suicide.  See David Hench, Killer Drove to Maine with a Long List of 
Sex Offenders, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006, at A1. 
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 81. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
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have expressed dissatisfaction with what they consider poorly articulated rationales 
from state judges who have departed from federal constitutional analyses.82  Some 
factors that have been considered by states in determining whether their own 
constitutions afford greater protection than the Federal Constitution are: differences 
between the text of the state and federal constitutional provisions; the history of the 
provision; structural differences between the state and federal constitutions; case 
law from other states; and state public policy concerns.83 
B.  Independent State Constitutional Analysis in Maine 
The Law Court has held that the Maine Constitution affords greater protection 
than its federal counterpart in a number of areas of criminal law.  For example, in 
State v. Collins, the Law Court held that the Maine Constitution provides a higher 
level of protection for the voluntariness of confessions.84  At the time, the United 
States Supreme Court had recently decided the case of Lego v. Twomey, where it 
established that the prosecution should bear the burden of establishing by a 
“preponderance of the evidence” the “voluntariness” of a confession.85  In doing so, 
the Supreme Court stressed that such a standard was adequate for promoting the 
government’s goal of deterring lawless conduct by police officers.86  The Law 
Court, in contrast, held that a heightened standard of scrutiny should be applied in 
Maine, requiring the voluntariness of confessions to be established by the 
prosecution by “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”87  In doing so, the Law Court 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial 
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 83. Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 764 (Wash. 2007). 
 84. 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972). 
 85. Id. at 625 (citing Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489).  The Twomey Court noted that it had long held that 
evidence, including involuntary confessions, obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” or the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
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 86. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489. 
 87. Collins, 297 A.2d at 627. 
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focused on Maine’s public policy goals and the “appropriate resolution of the 
values [we] find at stake.”88  The Law Court focused on the importance of 
safeguarding the right of the individual defendant in not being compelled into self-
incrimination, apart from the objective of deterring lawless conduct of police 
officers.89  The Law Court stressed the importance of the constitutional guarantee 
against self-incrimination in the furtherance of public policy in Maine.90 
The reliance on the importance of Maine’s public policy concerns was stressed 
again by the Law Court in State v. Rees, which reaffirmed Collins’ heightened 
standard on the voluntariness of confessions.91  In Rees, former Chief Justice 
Wathen’s majority opinion reiterated Maine’s public policy objective in 
safeguarding the rights of individual defendants, and concluded that the rationale in 
Collins continued to support the State’s public policy.92  In her dissent, then-
Associate Justice Saufley focused on the historical application of the federal and 
state provisions and noted that the Law Court, until recently, had consistently 
followed the analysis of the United States Supreme Court with regard to protection 
against self-incrimination.93  Justice Saufley stated: “[W]e have consistently 
interpreted fundamentally similar provisions of our constitution coextensively with 
their federal counterparts.  When we have chosen to depart from this principle, we 
have traditionally exercised great restraint in doing so.”94 
IV.  SHOULD THE LAW COURT HAVE CONDUCTED AN INDEPENDENT STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SORNA OF 
1999? 
A.  The Law Court Should Have Reserved the Question of Co-extensiveness for a 
Case When an Independent Analysis Would Have Been Necessary 
In Letalien, there was no cause for the Law Court to have explicitly foreclosed 
the possibility of an independent analysis under the state constitution because the 
court had already decided that the retroactive application of the law had fallen 
below the constitutional floor established by the federal ex post facto prohibition.  
In Doe v. Alaska, the Supreme Court of Alaska was faced with a statute that had 
already been held as passing federal constitutional muster by the United States 
Supreme Court using the “clearest proof” standard.95  In deciding that the Alaska 
Constitution afforded greater protection against ex post facto laws, the court noted 
that it was now faced with a federal decision that was inconsistent with the Alaska 
Constitution.96  In Letalien, on the other hand, the Law Court was not faced with a 
similar inconsistency.  It applied the “intent-effects” test according to federal 
precedent and determined that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 
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violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.  The Law Court went 
further and explicitly held that the clauses are coextensive.  As a result, the court 
foreclosed the possibility that, if presented with a case in the future where ex post 
facto analysis under the federal standard is inconsistent with the Maine 
Constitution, it may adopt an independent test, thus affording greater protection 
against ex post facto laws. 
B.  Can a More Useful Analysis Be Suggested? 
In relying solely on a comparison of the framers’ intent in drafting the 
respective constitutions, the Law Court failed to consider whether Maine’s public 
policy goals would have been better served by conducting an independent ex post 
facto analysis.97  The Law Court noted that the United States Supreme Court 
considered the Mendoza-Martinez factors to be but a “useful framework” for ex 
post facto analysis, yet mechanically considered each of the seven factors, deciding 
whether each one resulted in a determination of “punitive” or “nonpunitive.”98 
What the Law Court did not consider in its analysis was just how useful each 
of these seven factors is to laws challenged under the Ex Post Facto Clause, and 
whether a more useful test conducted independent of the federal courts’ analyses 
would have been more appropriate.  The Mendoza-Martinez case, in which the 
factors were originally enumerated, was a due process case.  All seven factors do 
not necessarily translate into the context of an ex post facto analysis.  For example, 
the factor concerning whether the obligation to register under SORNA is triggered 
only upon a finding of scienter seems wholly misplaced in the context of ex post 
facto analysis, and the Law Court disposed of this factor in one short sentence.99  
Another factor addresses whether the regulation is excessive in relation to a 
nonpunitive purpose.  Given the fact that another factor—the “rational connection 
to a nonpunitive purpose” factor—requires a court to determine whether the statute 
is narrowly drawn, a separate inquiry into whether the regulation is excessive 
seems redundant. 
A balancing analysis would have been a more useful approach for the Law 
Court to have applied in this case.  Such an analysis would require the court to 
weigh the state interests in protecting children against the burden placed upon the 
individual who is to be subjected to the more stringent registration requirements.  
Certain Mendoza-Martinez factors have relevance in a balancing analysis, while 
allowing the Law Court to tailor the approach so that it aligns more closely with ex 
post facto analysis in general and Maine’s public policy interests in particular, and 
does not “threaten rights protected by [the Maine] Constitution .”100 
When considering the burdens placed upon an individual resulting from the 
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, two main concerns should be 
considered.  The first is whether the regulation imposes an affirmative disability or 
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restraint.  In Letalien, the Law Court placed great emphasis on this factor.  The 
Law Court concluded that lifetime quarterly in-person registration requirements 
without the possibility of a waiver constituted a significant restraint on the 
individual.  The retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to Letalien imposed a 
substantial new burden on him by requiring him to physically report to his local 
law enforcement agency.    
Another concern is the stigma that is created upon registering as a sex 
offender.  The Law Court did not take this factor into account in its analysis, nor 
did it consider how the stigma itself can create an affirmative disability or restraint.  
For example, Letalien testified in the trial court that he had lost at least one job due 
to his status as a registered sex offender.101  One job loss resulted from pressure on 
his employer from customers “raising Cain that [he was] employing a sex offender” 
and from Letalien’s fears for his own safety after a co-worker who was also a 
registered sex offender was beaten to the point of requiring hospitalization.102  The 
stigma associated with being a registered sex offender can impact other aspects of 
life as well, such as housing.  For instance, after discovering that seventeen 
registered sex offenders were residing in one property in Portland, Maine, 
Portland’s City Manager announced that the City Council was working on an 
ordinance to ban sex offenders from living within 750 feet of a public or private 
school.103  In another instance, a registered sex offender committed suicide when 
faced with the prospect of police notifying the community of his presence in the 
neighborhood.104  These concerns highlight the fact that registering as a sex 
offender can affect registrants’ lives in real and substantial ways by affecting their 
ability to find employment and housing.  Retroactively imposing tougher 
registration requirements while at the same time eliminating the ability to ever be 
granted relief from them clearly imposes a significant burden on an individual. 
On the other side of the coin, the very legitimate state interest in protecting the 
public, particularly children, from convicted sex offenders must be considered.  
Community notification statutes warn parents when a potentially dangerous 
predator has moved into the neighborhood.  Thus, sex offender registry statutes 
have a nonpunitive purpose even though they may have a palpable detrimental 
effect on the registrant. 
However, one must ask how effective community notification laws are in 
promoting a state’s nonpunitive goal of protecting children.  Erik Lotke, in his 
article critiquing the effectiveness of community notification statutes, argued that 
sex offender registry laws were hastily passed by legislatures, are based on false 
assumptions, and are apt to create unintended problems that weaken any perceived 
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benefits.105  Though recidivism statistics are difficult to state with precision, many 
authorities consider sex offenders to be among the highest of any group likely to 
reoffend.106  However, other studies have shown the re-offense rates of sex 
offenders to be within the range of ten to eighteen percent—a rate much lower than 
for other types of crime.107  Furthermore, notification laws are based partially on 
the assumption that it is impossible to rehabilitate sex offenders.  Yet, studies on 
the effectiveness of treatment are at worst inconclusive, and at best show that 
treatment can make a substantial difference on recidivism rates of offenders.108  
Lotke also explained that notification statutes can have many unforeseen 
consequences, such as the impact on the victim, the likelihood that the offender 
will relocate to a community with less organized notification procedures, the 
possibility of vigilantism against the registered offender, and the possibility of 
lulling the public into a false sense of security, or, paradoxically, spreading an 
artificial sense of terror.109 
Moreover, the term “sex offense” under SORNA applies to a wide variety of 
behavior, and the almost total elimination of the waiver provision fails to take into 
account the fact that some offenders pose a higher risk of reoffending than others.  
For example, during Letalien’s trial, a psychologist testified that he did not meet 
any of the criteria of a pedophile, and that he presented the lowest possible risk of 
reoffending.110  On this assessment, a court could likely have waived his 
registration requirements after five years under SORNA of 1995.  Once SORNA of 
1999 was applied to Letalien, however, this possibility was eliminated.  SORNA of 
1999 is overbroad in this sense.  It neglects to take into account any assessment of 
risk among offenders, and as a result pulls low-risk perpetrators, like Letalien, 
within its scope along with high-risk, repeat offenders, without noting any 
distinction between them.  The failure of the Legislature to narrowly tailor the 
statute suggests that its effect is directed more towards punishment than the 
protection of children. 
Applying a balancing test to the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to 
those sentenced according to earlier versions of the law, it becomes clear that the 
burden to the individual outweighs the goals of the state, at least as SORNA of 
1999 exists in its current form.  The substantial burdens on liberty and privacy 
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placed on a registrant, taken with the broadness of SORNA of 1999 in 
encompassing such a wide variety of offenses without taking into account the 
individual’s risk of reoffending, suggests that the punitive effects are substantial 
enough to overcome the civil, regulatory intent of the Legislature. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is no easy answer to the question of how best to protect the public from 
convicted sex offenders living in their communities.  Registration and notification 
statutes like SORNA are one method states can utilize to further the goal of 
promoting public safety by making communities aware of potentially violent 
predators.  However, notification statutes can also place substantial burdens on the 
individual who must comply with them.  SORNA raises issues of liberty, privacy, 
and personal safety, and legislatures must narrowly tailor such statutes to ensure 
that the burdens are in proportion to the nonpunitive goal of protecting the public.  
For Letalien, there is no question that there is a significant difference between 
having to register as a sex offender for the next five to fifteen years, as he was 
required to do under SORNA of 1995, and having to register for the rest of his life 
with no possibility of relief from these duties, as was required under SORNA of 
1999.  The question became whether the retroactive application of the stricter 
version of the law was so punitive in effect as to constitute a violation of the ex 
post facto prohibition. 
While the Law Court reached the correct conclusion—that the law was so 
punitive in effect as to violate the state and Federal Constitutions—its analysis 
foreclosed on the opportunity of conducting an ex post facto analysis independent 
of the United States Supreme Court’s.  The question of whether the Maine 
Constitution affords a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws did not 
need to be reached in Letalien because the Law Court had already found that 
SORNA of 1999’s retroactive application did not meet the minimum standard set 
forth by the United States Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Law Court did not address the issue of whether a more 
appropriate ex post facto analysis could better serve Maine’s public policy 
interests.  Instead of relying on the Mendoza-Martinez factors, many of which have 
little or no relevance to challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Law Court 
could have used a balancing approach to evaluate the punitive effects of the statute.  
Utilizing a balancing approach would have allowed the Law Court to recognize the 
importance of both individual and state interests as reflected in Maine’s 
Constitution.  In order to achieve the “full realization of our liberties,” as Justice 
Brennan put it,111 the Law Court must ensure that state constitutional analysis in 
Maine carries the full protective force of law for its citizens. 
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